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CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-POSSIBLE,
BUT NOT DESIRABLE
BRETT H. McDONNELL*

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

-William

Shakespeare, Hamlet

-John

Lennon, You Are Here

"East is east and west is west
The twain shall meet."

1.

INTRODUCTION

prospects for international convergence in corporate governance
systems have become a hot topic in legal academia. For some time
scholars have depicted American corporations and capital markets as optimal adaptations for governing large business enterprises.' More recently,
American scholars have become more aware that other countries do
things rather differently. While large American corporations have many
dispersed shareholders and turn to public stock and bond markets for financing, large Japanese and German corporations have more concentrated shareholders and close financial relations with banks.
The differences have led scholars to ask several basic questions. Why
did corporate governance systems develop differently in these different
countries? 2 Which system does a better job at solving the problems of
corporate governance? 3 Will corporations in different countries converge
THE

to a similar system of corporate governance? 4 The dominant answers to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank

Daniel Farber, Richard Frase, David McGowan, George Mundstock, Paul Rubin,
Ferdinand Schoettle and participants in the works in progress workshop at the
University of Minnesota Law School for very helpful comments. Ethan Glass
provided helpful research assistance.
1. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
CorporateLaw, 89 GEo. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (discussing how American corporations
are "superior" for governing large business enterprises).
2. See MarkJ. Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStructure in Germany,Japan, and
the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1928-29 (1993) (examining historical and political influence on corporate governance). See generally JONATHAN P. CLARKHAM,
KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 1
(1994) (attributing differences to historical, social, political and economic forces).
3. For a discussion on the problems of corporate governance, see infra notes
4246 and accompanying text.
4. See generally CLARKuHAM, supra note 2, at 1 (describing importance in studying other systems so countries can remain competitive and suggesting possibility of
convergence).
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the last two questions, among elite American legal scholars, are currently
that the American system works better and that the other countries are in
the process of converging to the American system. Though there is some
dissent from this position, the main debate has been over why countries
outside the United States have persisted for so long in their benighted
systems and what form their convergence to the American way will take.
The scholarly discussion has converged too quickly on the convergence answer. The universe of theoretical possibilities is much richer than
a dominant strand of the literature suggests, and we are currently far short
of the sort of empirical evidence that might help us sort out these possibilities. Most commentators have focused on efficiency to the exclusion of
other values. Moreover, even if convergence occurs, there is a possibility
that we will not converge on the best system. Even if we converge to the
current best system, convergence still may not be desirable.
This Article, divided into seven sections, fleshes out the points made
in the previous paragraph. Following this introduction, Section II briefly
surveys the literature on convergence. Section III explores four idealized
stories, comparing the evolution to date of corporate governance systems
in the United States 5 on the one hand and Japan and Germany6 on the
other hand. The four stories are ideal types; reality will fall somewhere in
between them. I label the four stories P1 through P4 (past story 1 through
past story 4). P1 posits that American institutions have followed a path to
an optimal system, while Japanese and German institutions have followed
a sub-optimal path. P2 is the opposite story: Japanese and German institutions have followed an optimal path, while American institutions have not.
P3 maintains that the United States has followed a different path than
Japan and Germany, but one cannot meaningfully say that either of the
different systems is superior. Finally, according to P4, Japan and Germany
are on the same basic path as the United States, though on a variant of P4
those countries may be somewhat behind the United States on that path.
Section III presents a variety of arguments in favor of these different stories and canvasses some empirical evidence on their relative merits.
Section IV similarly explores four different paths that corporate governance systems may follow in the future. Under F1 (future story 1), bankcentered systems such as those in Japan and Germany will converge to a
market-centered system such as that in the United States. F2 is the opposite: the American market-centered system will converge to a bank-cen5. Much of what I say for the United States would also hold true for the
United Kingdom, but I focus here only on the United States.
6. Japan and Germany have some significant differences between themselves,
but except as noted below, at the level of generality considered in this Article it is
probably safe to consider them as similar systems, in contrast with the U.S. system.
Other European countries are generally closer to Germany than to the United
States, but there are some quite significant differences as well. A very interesting
question, but one I leave aside here, is the extent to which the greater integration
of the European Union will bring corporate governance in the member countries
closer to each other.
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tered system. F3 posits a hybrid possibility: the bank-centered and marketcentered systems will converge to a hybrid system, which combines elements of both. Finally, according to F4, the countries will remain (or become) distinct. Section IV also surveys some evidence as to how the
different systems appear to be changing, or not changing, at this point.
Section V relates the stories developed in Sections III and IV. Each
story of how we got to where we are today (Section III) may potentially be
combined with any one of the stories of where we are going (Section IV).
For instance, the dominant convergence story combines P1 (the American
system has evolved optimally) with F1 (Japan and Germany will converge
to the American system). Conceptually, this leads to sixteen possible combinations of past and future stories. Section V argues that at this point we
do not have very good reasons to choose among these scenarios. At first
blush, some combinations may appear implausible. For instance, if P1 is
true and the American system is optimal, then why would the United
States converge to the Japanese and German system, as F2 posits? Yet,
Section V presents a variety of arguments as to why this could happen. At
the end of the section, I hypothesize that the most likely combination is P3
and F3. That is, the United States has, up to now, followed a different
path from Japan and Germany, but we cannot meaningfully say that one
system is overall superior to the other. In the future, the systems will converge to a hybrid system, but one much closer to the United States than to
Japan or Germany. I believe that this is the single most likely possibility of
the sixteen; however, it is more likely that one of the other fifteen possibilities will turn out to be closer to the truth.
Section VI asks the normative question as to how we should evaluate
the various possibilities presented in Section V. It would seem obvious
that if P1 is true and the American system is the superior one among those
currently existing, then F1 would be the best future option-that is, it
would be best if other countries converged to the American system. It is
not really so obvious, however. Even if the American system is superior
under current circumstances, other systems may become preferable as future circumstances change. We should therefore preserve international
organizational variety so that there are more options available for future
evolution.
Section VII concludes with a call for greater balance in the treatment
of corporate governance systems by academics, policymakers and opinionsetters.
II.

THE CONVERGENCE LITERATURE

Economists as well as legal scholars have noted some major differences in corporate governance between the United States, on the one
hand, and Japan and Germany, on the other hand. 7 In a very stylized
7. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 4
(2000) (sharing differences between nations regarding financial markets, banks
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rendering, the differences are as follows. American firms rely more on
stock and bond markets for external financing. The norm is that corporations are to be governed in the interests of their shareholders.8 Although
those shareholders are dispersed with relatively small holdings, creating a
free rider problem in shareholder monitoring of management, the threat,
and sometimes the reality, of corporate takeovers serves as a major disciplinary device. 9 Active external labor markets for managers also provide an
incentive to do a good job. 10 Corporate laws provide relatively extensive
protections for shareholders, and courts are relatively active in enforcing
those protections.
The landscape looks different in Japan and Germany. Companies
there rely more on banks for external financing. Large companies generally have one bank-a main bank in Japan, and a universal bank in Germany 1 -that is heavily involved with the company at a variety of levels,
including holding shares in the company as well as lending to it. Those
banks specialize in monitoring the companies with which they are involved
and may intervene more actively in troubled companies than do their
American counterparts. 12 Shareholdings are more concentrated than in
and external corporate governance);

CLARKHAM, supra note 2, at 349-66 (contrasting governance laws in Japan, Germany, United Kingdom and others); COMPARA-

TIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH V-Vi

(Klaus

J.

Hopt et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERN-

ANCE] (noting that book focused on corporate governance systems in Japan, Europe and United States); Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese
Firm, 28J. ECON. LIT. 1, 2 (1990) (noting that Japanese model "is at odds" with
Anglo-American model); Roe, supra note 2, at 1928-29 (describing difference between nations in corporate law, history and politics).
8. But see Symposium: CorporateMalaise-StakeholderStatutes: Cause or Cure?, 21
STETSON L. REv. 1, 23-252 (1991) (collecting articles discussing growth of corporate constituency statutes).
9. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
LAw 76 (1991) ("It is true that in public corporations directors are

OF CORPORATE

rarely evicted in midterm, but the possibility of ouster may be sufficient to ensure
that directors act as faithful agents .... "); Henry Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor
Corporate Control, 73J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965) (describing how poor management lowers stock price, thereby attracting take-over candidates).
10. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL.
ECON. 288, 293-95 (1980) (showing how external manager labor market influences

manager performance because likelihood of securing or retaining job depends on
success of company).
11. "Main bank" refers to the bank with which a Japanese firm has a special
long-term relationship. Main banks typically provide loans, hold equity in the firm
and are expected to monitor the firm's performance. "Universal banks" in Germany provide a wide range of financial services, including deposits, securities services, dealing in real estate, and so on.
12. See Aoki, supra note 7, at 14-18 (describing differences between American
and Japanese monitoring of companies in "bad profit states"); George J. Benston,
Universal Banking, 8J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 122-23 (1994) (describing differences between American and Japanese investment banking operations); Paul Sheard, Main
Banks and the Governance of FinancialDistress, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM
188, 188 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994) (discussing role banks play
when client firms encounter financial difficulty). But see Ekkehard Wenger &
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the United States. In the case of Germany, wealthy individuals and families as well as nonfinancial firms tend to be the large blockholders. In
Japan, nonfinancial firms and the banks are involved in an extensive series
of cross-holdings among inter-related groups of firms. The general norm
is that companies are to be run in the interests of both shareholders and
employees, not just shareholders. 13 Takeovers are rare, and managerial
promotion is internal within companies, rather than across companies.
Corporate laws provide weaker protections for shareholders and are less
frequently enforced.
Some people think these differences are overstated, and we shall consider that position below. Note that the differences mainly look to differences in the governance of large public corporations-small, closely held
businesses probably look more similar in the three countries. The differences at the large corporation level, however, do have some implications
for smaller companies as well. For instance, the venture capitalist model
of governance for high tech startups has been important for recent American success. Such startups are governed much differently from large public corporations. Nevertheless, the availability of broad, American-style
stock markets to provide an exit strategy for investors in such startups is
14
probably crucial to the functioning of the venture capital system.
For the moment, let us accept that there are some such differences
between countries in corporate governance. Their existence prompts
questions such as: Why do the differences exist? Does one system work
better than the other? Is there any tendency for one of the systems to
come to resemble the other over time, particularly as globalization spreads
and competition between companies in different countries becomes more
intense? These are some of the major questions faced in the field of comparative corporate governance.
The literature on convergence in corporate governance is not static; it
has shifted significantly over the last decade. 15 However, for the broadest

and boldest statement of the view that currently dominates American legal
academia, one should peruse The End of History for CorporateLaw by Henry

Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman. 1 6 Hansmann and Kraakman believe
Christoph Kaserer, German Banks and CorporateGovernance: A Critical View, in COMPARATlVE CORPORATE GovEaANCE, supra note 7, at 499, 522 (claiming that German
corporate governance system "cannot work very well" due to bank influence and
lack of disclosure obligations).
13. See Ct Aum, supra note 2, at 360-61 (describing Japanese and German
corporate accountability); Aoki, supra note 7, at 20 (describing dual control by
financial and employees interests over corporate decision-making).

14. For an explanation on how liquid markets support venture capitalization,
see infra note 46.
15. This section is not by any means a comprehensive survey of the literature
on convergence in corporate governance. That literature is fairly extensive and
growing rapidly.
16. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1 (arguing shareholdercentered ideology dominates corporate governance, resulting in little variation in
corporate governance practice).

346

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 341

they have spotted a growing consensus in academia, business and government in favor of a shareholder and market-oriented model of corporate
governance along American lines.' 7 They consider various alternative
models and find them wanting-based on very little evidence, it must be
said. They also point to some limited evidence of movement towards the
American model in Europe and Japan as proof of their thesis.' 8 Capital
markets and institutional investors prefer the American model and are
helping to export it elsewhere because it has proved its superiority in practice. 19 Thus, they think the world is converging to the American way, and
that is a good thing.
Nothing else in the literature is quite so sweeping as Hansmann and
Kraakman, but a number of other scholars seem to accept the basic point.
John Coffee 20 and Ronald Gilson 2' distinguish formal and functional convergence. Formal convergence refers to companies coming to be governed by the same legal forms. Coffee and Gilson believe that formal
convergence is probably a long way away. Nevertheless, they argue that
different formal institutions in different countries may come to play the
same function. For instance, shareholder protections may be created
through rules imposed by stock exchanges rather than imposed by corporate law and courts. 2 2 Coffee and Gilson assert that functional convergence to the American model is developing rapidly and will continue to
do so. They point, for instance, to the growing number of non-American
companies which are choosing to list on American stock exchanges,
thereby binding themselves to follow corporate governance rules required
for companies listed on those exchanges.

17. See id. at 440-41

(discussing growing consensus and its principle

elements).

18. See id. at 452 (describing increase in stock ownership and corporate governance reform in Europe and Japan).
19. See id. at 451 (noting that equity investors prefer American model).

20. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CONVERGENCE AND ITS CRITICS: WHAT ARE THE
PRECONDITIONS TO THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL? 2-5 (Columbia
Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 179, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241 782 (describing separate convergence theories); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications,93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 64647 (1999) (asserting multiple factors create different types of convergence).
21. See RONALD J. GiLSON, GLOBALIZING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CONVERGENCE OF FoRM OR FUNCTION, 7 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin, Working Paper No. 192 and Columbia Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 174, 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=229517 (indicating prediction whether convergence will be formal or functional is focus of article); see also Ronald J. Gilson, CorporateGovernance and Economic Efficiency: When Do
InstitutionsMatter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 34243 (1996) (differentiating functional
convergence).
22. See GILsON, supra note 21, at 26 (discussing Coffee's second example of
convergence by contract, convergence through stock exchange listing).
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Other legal scholars who argue that some kind and degree of convergence to the American model is occurring include Lawrence Cunning26
25
ham, 23 Jeffrey Gordon, 24 Mary Kissane and Gustavo Visentini.
Scholarly fashion looked rather different a decade ago. In the 1980s
Japanese companies seemed to be outcompeting American companies.
Many economists pointed to advantages of the Japanese system. 2 7 In legal
academia, Mark Roe wrote a series of papers and a book arguing that populist-inspired laws had prevented the United States from developing a similar system of bank-led capitalism, calling into question whether the
American system had evolved optimally. 28 Others also wrote papers extolling the advantages of Japan, although some scholars countered with arti29
cles examining disadvantages of the Japanese system.
Today, Roe is still contributing papers suggesting a path-dependent,
30
politics-driven evolution of different systems in different countries.
Now, though, Roe seems to concentrate more on political limits to the
23. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptionsin the Vertical
Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1133, 1143-46 (1999)
(predicting partial convergence to hybrid model, but one whose core features appear more typical of American model).
24. SeeJeffrey Gordon, Pathways to CorporateConvergence? Two Steps on the Road
to Shareholder Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 219, 219-20 (1999) (seeing
cross-border acquisitions as force tending to lead to convergence to American
system).
25. See Mary E. Kissane, Global Gadflies: Applications and Implications of U.S.-Style
Corporate Governance Abroad, 17 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 621, 626-33 (1997)
(discussing role of shareholder activism in leading to convergence).
26. See Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and
American CorporateGovernance: Which Model of Capitalism?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833,
846-48 (1998) (focusing on increasing international competition among financial
institutions).
27. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL E. PORTER, CAPITAL CHOICES: CHANGING THE WAY
AMERICA INvEsTs IN INDUSTRY 19 (1992) (discussing investment reforms that could
allow United States to surpass Japan); Aoki, supra note 7, at 24 (describing advantages of Japan's horizontal coordination compared to hierarchical coordination);
Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation,67 HARV. Bus. Rxv. 61, 63
(1989) (praising Japanese governance laws).
28. See MARKJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 283-87 (1994) (indicating American governance
system developed inefficiently); Roe, supra note 2, at 1930 ("These laws, necessary
to fully understand the American public firm, have been the San Andreas fault line
in American corporate governance historically severing America's largest financial
institutions from its largest industrial firms."); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American CorporateFinance,91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 10-11 (1991) (arguing that American public corporation is political adaptation).
29. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 81-89 (1995) (arguing thatJapanese governance structure precludes robust control market); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on
DrawingLessons from Comparative CorporateLaw, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2023-30 (1993)
(producing evidence of Japanese system's inferiority).
30. The idea of path dependence in this context basically says that once a
country has settled on a basic corporate governance system, it will have much
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Japanese and German systems. 31 Still, Roe's work on path dependence in
corporate governance provides a theoretical basis for questioning recent
32
work on convergence.
A few other legal scholars have also questioned the convergence thesis. Douglas Branson 33 and Amir Licht 34 have suggested that cultural values will ensure that governance systems and laws remain quite diverse
around the world. Branson and Licht also take a much more genuinely
global perspective than most of the legal literature, which tends to focus
mostly on the United States, parts of Europe and Japan. Evidence for corporate governance convergence outside these economically developed
countries is certainly much weaker.
I should also mention a series of papers by four economists (the
"gang of four"), which has had an important influence on the convergence literature.3 5 The gang has examined the relationship between laws
and corporate governance using systematic data from dozens of countries. 36 Their work suggests that laws that protect minority shareholders
and bondholders, which are more likely to develop in common law countries, lead to the development of larger and more liquid capital markets,
trouble switching to an alternative system, even if that alternative system has
proven itself better. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
31. See RonaldJ. Gilson & MarkJ. Roe, The PoliticalEconomy ofJapaneseLifetime
Employment, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 239, 239-71 (Margaret M.
Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (discussing politically-mandated lifetime employment); MarkJ. Roe, Codeterminationand German SecuritiesMarkets, in EMPLOYEES AND
CORPORATE GOvERNANCE, supra, at 194, 194-204 (discussing block, family ownership and codetermination in German corporation).
32. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
CorporateOwnership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 169-70 (1999) (indicating
path-dependency alternative to convergence).

33. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THE VERY UNCERTAIN PROSPECT OF "GLOBAL"
CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 (University of Pittsburgh School of
Law, Working Paper, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=244742 ("The global convergence in corporate governance's
scholarship tramples on the diversity of cultures present in the world . . ").
34. See Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies-Towarda Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 149-50 (2001)
(indicating culture may affect governance laws); see also AMIR N. LICHT ET AL., CULTURE, LAW AND FINANCE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAWS

4 (Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Working Paper, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taPabstract-id=267190 (claiming that cultural values impact
governance laws).
35. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., CorporateOwnership Around the World, 54
J. FIN. 471 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership] (examining
controlling shareholders in different countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance] (examining legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and
creditors); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants] (describing legal environment and influences on capital markets in various countries).
36. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants,supra note 35, at 1131-32 (describing
various studies conducted).
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with more dispersed shareholdings of companies. 37 They also suggest that
companies in countries with larger capital markets are more productive.
Even if one accepts their results, 38 the implications for the convergence
debate are uncertain, as one would need to add in a theory of political
economy to predict whether countries with less protective laws are likely to
modify those laws so that they can develop more effective capital markets.
I want to briefly acknowledge and then ignore one point Branson emphasizes. 39 Most of the convergence scholarship does indeed focus on a
few wealthy countries in Europe, North America and part of East Asia. I
shall do the same. It is true that outside this limited sphere the prospects
for convergence to an American corporate governance model are certainly dimmer. However, I am concerned here with governance models
that will allow companies to achieve high levels of productivity. The American and the Japanese-German models, to date, have been the only main
models that have proven able to do this on a mass scale. Although many
individuals may eschew the materialism rampant in those countries, I
rather strongly suspect that most countries that have yet to achieve similar
levels of productivity have not done so voluntarily. If they could achieve
that same productivity and resulting level of wealth, they would do so.
This is not to say that the two models I consider here are necessarily
the best possible alternatives. Someone someday may come up with something better. Indeed, perhaps someone already has, but it has not yet
achieved mass success. Who could reasonably claim to know the best possible model of corporate governance for all time and circumstances yet to
come? 40 Perhaps Hansmann and Kraakman, if one takes the "end of history" phrase in their title seriously, but ordinary mortals may want to be
more circumspect in their claims. For us, though, these two models are
the main ones currently available for consideration.
III.

FOUR STORIES OF THE PAST

In this section, I present four competing idealized stories about where
we are today and how we got there. The four stories are ideal types; a
continuum of possibilities lies between the ideals. Reality almost certainly
lies in that in-between world. Probably no serious scholar believes any of
the pure stories. Nevertheless, I hope that the stories help clarify thought.
37. See La Porta et al., CorporateOwnership, supra note 35, at 511 (finding equity markets both broader and more valuable in countries with good legal protection of minority shareholders).
38. I have my doubts about the direction of causality. I do not think they have
convincingly ruled out the possibility that developed capital markets give rise to
pressure to protect bondholders and minority shareholders, rather than the
reverse.
39. See BRANSON, supra note 33, at 7-8 (arguing that convergence theorists ignore most nations).
40. This question, indeed, is at the core of my argument for continued international diversity in corporate governance. See infra Section VI (arguing need for
diversity and variability).
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The first three stories differ in their evaluation of which system, if any,
has evolved optimally. As a preliminary note I must, therefore, consider
what standards to use in describing a corporate governance system as "optimal" or "superior." As an economist as well as a lawyer, I am professionally tempted to simply substitute "efficient" for "optimal." I shall try to
avoid the temptation.
At the risk of succumbing, I shall start with efficiency as the first criterion to consider in comparing systems. Economists have several different
meanings for "efficiency." They most often like to invoke the concept of
Pareto optimality, as it requires less tricky ethical defense than the main
alternative, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 41 Alas, in a comparison of entire national corporate governance regimes, Pareto optimality is of little usealmost certainly, some parties are better off in one system and other parties better off in the other. Kaldor-Hicks will have to do.
In considering efficiency in this sense, we must consider which system
better solves the various agency problems created by the corporate form
while also realizing the gains in managing a large enterprise which that
form provides. Agency problems arise at all levels of a corporation: directors may not act in the best interests of shareholders (and perhaps other
stakeholder groups, depending on where one stands in the shareholderstakeholder debate); 4 2 officers may not act as directors would like them to;
employees may not act as the managers supervising them would prefer.
There is much debate over how well the competing corporate governance
systems deal with these agency problems. 43 The different systems also
solve the team production and coordination problems a large organization faces differently. 44 Other concerns also affect the efficiency of a sys41. One distribution is Pareto superior to another if in the superior distribution there is at least one person who is better off and no person worse off. A
distribution is Pareto optimal if no distribution is Pareto superior to it. A change
from one distribution to another is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it is possible to compensate anyone made worse off by the change so that after such compensation the
resulting distribution would be Pareto superior to the original. The key difference
is that under Kaldor-Hicks no compensation need actually be made, so that some
persons may actually be worse off in the more efficient distribution. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-17 (5th ed. 1998) (describing gap between Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto measures).
42. This debate concerns whether corporate decisions should be made to
benefit only the interests of their shareholders, or whether the interests of other
groups (or "stakeholders"), such as employees, creditors, customers and suppliers,
should be promoted as well, even when in conflict with the interests of shareholders. For a useful collection of related articles, see Symposium: CorporateMalaise,
supra note 8, at 23-252 (presenting various articles on stakeholder and shareholder

rights).
43. For a discussion of P1 and P2, see infra note 53-104 and accompanying

text.
44. See infra notes 59 and 96 and accompanying text. By team production and
coordination problems, I refer to the fact that corporations involve a large number
of participants who must work together. In doing this work, they must all make a
myriad of decisions, and they must coordinate those decisions and the actions that
result.
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tern of corporate governance as well. For instance, different systems may
impose different levels of risk on participants. 45 In addition, systems may
differ in how well they encourage long-run technological innovation. 46
Other values matter besides efficiency. Distributional equity is one
major competing value, although of course there is much argument over
what constitutes distributional equity. Many see equity as arguing for increased equality of income and wealth; 47 others find increased equality an
uncompelling goal. 48 Equity may conflict with efficiency; for instance, it is
quite possible that the American system is more efficient but results in
greater inequality. If so, we face a tradeoff.4 9
45. For instance, shareholders of a corporation are exposed to more risk than
depositors in a bank.
46. For instance, supporters of the American system point to the innovation
coming out of Silicon Valley, and argue that the venture capital system which supports it depends on a strong equity market which supports initial public offerings.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 47, 48-53 (1998) (suggesting
that ability to divulge shares encourages investment).
To further complicate matters, one should distinguish efficiency comparisons
of entire systems versus comparisons of just one piece within a system. For the
latter comparison, one faces a second-best problem: an institution may be the firstbest way of doing things within an overall efficient system, but may not be best
given an overall inefficient system. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. To
complicate matters even more, note that the corporate governance system as a
whole is in turn just one piece of a larger economic system, and second-best considerations may therefore apply to the corporate governance system as a whole.
For instance, Mark Roe has argued that within an economy where product markets
are not competitive, a corporate governance system that encourages aggressive
maximization of shareholder value may be sub-optimal, as it will lead to worse
monopoly effects. This may be a reason why the Japanese and German system may
be better in those countries, where product markets are often not competitive,
while a more shareholder-focused system is better in the United States with its
competitive product markets. See Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1463, 1465 (2001) (discussing how extent of competition
can affect governance structure appropriateness).
47. The modern classic is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
48. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 232-33 (1974) (noting
that some legitimate processes might yield inequality of material conditions).
49. A standard argument is that equity should be pursued through taxation
and transfer policies, which distort incentives less. See Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 834-35 (2000) (defending view that tax system can achieve redistribution more efficiently); Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994) (concluding that redistribution is
more efficiently achieved through tax systems rather than legal rules). Recently,
however, Chris Sanchirico has voiced some important objections to this position.
See

CHRIS WILLIAM SANCHIRICO, INEQUITY AND
BATE ON EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE LAw

DISTORTION: THE CONTINUING DE-

(A COUNTER-RESPONSE

TO PROFESSORS

7-23 (University of Virginia Law School Law-Economics Research, Working Paper No. 00-19, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=241573 (responding to arguments in favor of dealing with
inequality through tax policy, while seeking only efficiency in legal rules); Chris
William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules As Instruments for Equity: A More EquitaKAPLOW AND SHAVELL)
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A final criterion considered at points in this Article is the value of
participation. Corporate governance systems certainly affect the level of
participation in decision-making by various groups within the corporation,
and they may have an indirect effect on the ability of groups to participate
effectively in the political system as well. Participation may be an important value both within firms as well as within political institutions. Participation in making decisions, which importantly affect one's life, may be
considered important in itself,5 0 and may also make participants psycho-

logically more fulfilled. 5 1 Greater participation at work also may increase
democratic skills and norms, thereby strengthening political
participation.

52

I thus consider three different criteria-efficiency, distributional equity and participation-in asking which of the two corporate governance
systems are superior. I do not attempt here to give a relative weight to
these criteria, so to the extent that they conflict in their judgments, such
conflict leaves a degree of indeterminacy in one's comparison of the systems. Different observers will weight these criteria differently. One possibility is that most Americans would weight the criteria such that the
American system is preferred, while most Germans and Japanese would do
the reverse. To the extent that different criteria point in different directions, we ultimately need to develop systematic arguments focusing on the
weight of different criteria. As a professional economist and an amateur

philosopher (at best), for here the most I can contribute is some sense of
what economics can tell us about how well the two systems function ac-

cording to the different criteria, leaving the weighting of those criteria to
other work. Note that other empirical disciplines, especially sociology,
may have much to say about how well the two systems function under the

various criteria, especially equity and participation, but for here, I largely
ignore such non-economic evidence. Again, in doing so I can only plead
my personal comparative advantage in using economics.

I now turn to describing four stories about how the systems of corporate governance in the United States, Japan and Germany have gotten to
where they are today and their relative desirability as measured by the criteria just discussed.
ble View, 29 J.

LEGAL STUD. 797, 804-05 (2000) (arguing that legal rules ought to
always be factor in redistribution policies).
50. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 111-35
(1985) (arguing in favor of democratizing economic institutions).
51. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Seif-Realisation in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life, in ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM 127 (Jon Elster & Karl Ove
Moene eds., 1989) (discussing arguments in favor of capitalism).
52. See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-66
(1970) (discussing relationship between participation in workplaces and participation in wider political sphere); SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND
CAPITALISM 131-35 (1986) (discussing anti-democratic effects of capitalist structure
of production upon individuals).
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A.

PI: The United States Has Evolved Optimally;
Japan and Germany Have Not

I must explain several parts to this story. First, I canvas reasons why,
given the relevant standard of optimality, the American system may be
preferable to that of Japan and Germany. Second, I shall look at reasons
why Japan and Germany may have failed to find the best path.
According to this story, the American system best balances disciplining managers and coordinating decisions with providing diversification
and liquidity to investors. Broad and diversified American financial markets allow investors to construct portfolios which suit their individual
needs. 53 Dispersed shareholding does create collective action problems in
monitoring managers. An active market for corporate control, however,
acts as a major deterrent against managerial misbehavior. 54 In addition,
an active external labor market for high-level corporate managers gives
managers a juicy carrot encouraging them to perform well. 55 Competitive
product markets 56 and the threat of shareholder suits5 7 present large
sticks threatening miscreant corporate managers. Independent boards of
58
directors are increasingly invoked as an active monitoring mechanism.
American corporations tend to have more centralized, hierarchical deci53. The importance of diversification in assembling an investment portfolio is
a core principle of modem finance theory. See RicHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 149-56 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing relationship of risk and return in building portfolios).
54. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 162-211 (discussing tender
offers as corporate control transactions).
55. See Fama, supra note 10, at 292-95 (discussing how pressure from managerial labor markets disciplines managers).
56. See Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELLJ.
ECON. 366, 381 (1983) (concluding that competitive product markets can reduce
managerial slack in economy).
57. At least until 1994, shareholder derivative actions in Japan were less legally favored than in the United States and rare. See Mark D. West, The Pricingof
ShareholderDerivative Actions in Japanand the United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1436,
1437-38 (1994) (noting relative rarity of derivative litigation in Japanese corporate
landscape).
58. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1283, 1318
(1998) (noting strong relationship between active board monitoring and corporate economic performance). Many organizations and companies have in recent
years produced corporate governance guidelines that frequently focus on active
board monitoring. For full text copies of many of these guidelines, see generally
European Corporate Governance Network, Corporate Governance Codes, Principles,
Recommendations and Laws, at http://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/ecgn/codes.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2001) (providing copies of, and links to, various corporate guidelines).
But see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The UncertainRelationshipBetween Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. L. 921, 940-50 (1999) (surveying empirical
evidence on board composition and finding no clear evidence for better performance by firms with majority-independent boards).
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sion-making than Japan. This may make them more able to make large,
rapid changes.5"
All of these mechanisms are weaker to non-existent in Japan and Germany. Japanese and German banks depend on their relations with a rela60
tively small number of firms, perhaps making them under-diversified.
Until recently, at least, extensive cross-shareholdings and widespread
norms have ensured that hostile takeovers virtually never happen. 6 1 The
external labor market is much less active, 62 and product markets are less
competitive. 63 Shareholders suits also are much less common.154 It is
claimed as a compensating benefit that Japanese and German banks actively monitor the performance of managers. 65 There is debate, however,
over whether that actually happens. 66 Even if it does, banks may not encourage behavior in the best interests of shareholders, since as
debtholders banks have incentives to prefer too little risk-taking. 67 Moreover, banks or other large shareholders may tend to prefer their own interests to those of small shareholders. 68 Perhaps most seriously, Japanese
and German banks may not have the proper incentive to shut down poorly
performing companies, leading to a soft budget constraint where corpo59. See David Charny, Workers and CorporateGovernance: The Role of PoliticalCulture, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 31, at 91, 111-12 (noting greater responsiveness and flexibility of American system of corporate
governance).
60. See Macey & Miller, supra note 29, at 81-89 (discussing Japanese system of
main banks and German system of universal banks). But note: even if the banks
are under-diversified, the underlying depositors in those banks are probably subject to less risk than individual investors in American capital markets. However,
the possible lack of diversification may create dangers for the financial soundness
of the Japanese banking system.
61. SeeJulian Franks & Colin Mayer, Bank Control, Takeovers, and Corporate Governance in Germany, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 641,
642 (noting scarcity of hostile takeovers); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and
Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 3 JAPANESE BUSINESS 120, 129 (Schon
Beechler & Kristin Stucker eds., 1998) (stating that corporate takeovers are "unheard of" in Japan).
62. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 31, at 258 (noting that closed labor markets
complement Japan's lifetime employment system).
63. See Roe, supra note 46, at 1493 (noting that weaker shareholder primacy
norms are present in nations with weak product markets).
64. See West, supra note 57, at 1437-38 (noting rarity of shareholder derivative
actions in Japan). But see Japan'sCorporateGovernance U-Turn, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18,
2000, at 73 (providing information that states derivative suits have grown in Japan
to about 200 per year).
65. See, e.g.,
Wenger & Kaserer, supra note 12, at 499, 511 (discussing pecuniary incentives for management).
66. See id.
67. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 68 (noting that debtholder
with fixed claim on income stream has little to gain from borrower's pursuit of new
projects).
68. For a discussion on behavior of banks in monitoring corporate governance, see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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rate failure is not punished. 69 Many observers think this may be an important contributing factor to the decade-long under-performance of the
Japanese economy. Japanese boards tend to be awkwardly large and filled
with insiders, while German supervisory boards are limited in their effectiveness due to conflicts between shareholder and employee representatives. 70 The more decentralized and consensual decision-making of
Japanese corporations may have limited their ability to rapidly adapt to
71
new market conditions in the nineties.
As for distributional equity, if one values equality it is somewhat hard
to make the case that the American system tends to create more equality
than in Japan or Germany. The gap between wages of top managers and
ordinary employees tends to be much higher in the United States. One
might argue that the extremeness of this gap is a relatively recent phenomenon, due largely to the growing use of stock options, which is not necessarily inherent to the American system. Nevertheless, while one could so
argue, it would be hard to do with a straight face. One might instead try to
argue that the American system justly rewards talent, risk-taking and hard
work, and in doing so is fairer than its competitors. In part there is thus a
conflict over preferred visions of distributive equity in comparing the two
systems, although there is also some argument as to the extent to which
the American system may value luck and social breeding rather than the
qualities just mentioned.
With respect to the value of participation, the American system encourages widespread involvement in capital market investment. American
households invest far more of their wealth in shares than do Japanese or
German households. 72 The regulation of capital markets in the United
States is probably quite a bit more responsive to the desires of small investors than is the regulation of capital markets or banks in Japan and Germany. Although American firms in general appear to give employees less
of a role in corporate decision-making than in Japan or Germany, it is
easier for entrepreneurial individuals in the United States to start up their
own companies.

73

69. See Brett H. McDonnell, Banks, Worker-Controlled Firms, and the Soft Budget
Constraint,in LABOR MANAGED FiRMs AND BANKs (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the Stanford University Library).
70. See Roe, supra note 31, at 203 (noting that weakness of German supervisory boards may be structurally linked to "codetermination" by employee board
members).
71. See Charny, supra note 59, at 110-11 (noting problems encountered under
Japanese corporate governance system when rapid adaptation is necessary).
72. See Wolfgang Gerke, Market Failure in Venture Capital Markets for New Medium and Small Enterprises, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7,
at 607, 612-14 (discussing distribution of share ownership).
73. See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate
Finance,85 CAL. L. REV. 1,58-60 (1997) (discussing role of entrepreneur in American corporate finance).

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 341

P1 adherents must explain why Japanese and German markets have
not evolved optimally. After all, the standard approach in corporate law
over the last few decades has assumed that market forces weed out poor
approaches and create a strong evolutionary pressure toward adoption of
optimal forms of corporate governance.7 4 What has kept this from happening in Japan and Germany, on the P1 story? Here is our first encounter in this Article with system-theoretic explanations and the notion of
path dependence, so I shall spend a little time here outlining those ideas,
which are important in what follows. What I shall call system-theoretic
explanations emphasize the way in which a variety of elements within the
two different systems interact with each other. Each different internal element of a system complements and supports a variety of other elements.
As a result, it is hard to change any one element of such a system without
changing the others as well. However, it may not be within the power of
any actor within the system to change all of the elements together. Indeed, it may not even be socially good to change just one part of a suboptimal system, making that part resemble its counterpart in a better system, if other parts of the system are not simultaneously changed. Piecemeal change actually may make things worse. That is the lesson of the
theory of the second best. 75 Therefore, once a country's institutions have
developed the elements of one system, it may be very difficult to change to
another system-the country has gotten "locked-in" to that system. There
are thus multiple equilibriums-multiple systems that a country may follow. It is possible that one equilibrium or system may be superior to the
others, and yet a country locked-in to an inferior system may not be able to

switch to the superior one. Which equilibrium a country has arrived at will
depend on the history it has followed in getting there-that is the core
76
idea of path dependence.
74. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 13 ("The history of corporations has been that firms failing to adapt their governance structures are ground
under by competition.").
75. For an overview of the theory of the second best in the law and economics
context, see generally Symposium on Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1998) (providing various views on second-best theory).
76. See Masahiko Aoki, The JapaneseFirm As a System of Attributes: A Survey and
Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE FIRM: SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 11, 27

(Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1994) (noting that Japanese and Western
firm may be on different equilibrium paths); W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in THE ECONOMY As AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 9, 17-23
(Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 1988) (discussing path dependence and its relation to allocation processes); Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 32, at 169 (concluding

that corporate structures are likely to reflect structures from earlier times); William
W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory
of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213,
219 (1999) (noting that interdependence of components within economic systems
present barriers to adoption of components derived from foreign systems); Mark
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 479, 483-84 (1998) (describing "network effects" concept, under which utility derived from use of certain systems increases as more agents make use of them);
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What are the sources of the inter-relationships among different elements of a system that may cause such path dependence? A variety have
been offered and classified in various ways. I suggest four categories of
system effects: politics and rent-seeking, structural relationships, informa77
tional effects, and values and norms.
Politics and rent-seeking are one source of system effects. 78 Inefficient laws may have keptJapan and Germany from the optimal pattern. In
Germany, co-determination laws are not only undesirable in imposing labor representation on supervisory boards, but also may have discouraged
the development of dispersed shareholding. 79 The argument is that dispersed shareholding may require strong board supervision to be effective,
but co-determined boards are so conflict-ridden that they are generally
ineffective. 80 Both Japan and Germany may lack strong corporate and securities laws that provide effective protection for minority shareholdersthis is the theme of important recent empirical work by the gang of four
economists.

81

Although it would be efficient to change these laws, the

interests of entrenched bank and firm managers may present a formidable
obstacle to change. Rent-seeking may also occur within firms, as those
who gain from the current system, especially corporate managers, do not
have incentive to change their firm's structures even if such change would
increase overall efficiency, and transaction costs may block the bargaining
82
that could induce them to change.
Different parts of the corporate governance system are also structurally inter-related. Concentrated blockholders rely on being able to gain
private benefits at the expense of other shareholders in order to induce
them to bear monitoring costs, so active legal enforcement of fiduciary
83
duties may not be consistent with the Japanese and German systems.
Main bank monitoring protects managers and employees of firms from
MarkJ. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARv. L. REv. 641, 644-

46 (1996) (discussing path dependencies in corporate structures).
77. For a somewhat different but related categorization, see Bebchuk & Roe,
supra note 32, at 137-39 (describing sources of path dependence).
78. "Rent-seeking" refers to when individuals devote resources to achieving or
defending personal benefits that do not benefit society to the same extent that the
individuals are benefited. For instance, if large shareholders in Germany benefit
from weak securities laws that help them run corporations in ways that favor their
interests at the expense of small shareholders, those large shareholders will lobby
to prevent changes in the securities laws.
79. See Roe, supra note 31, at 199-202 (discussing German securities markets
and public choice).
80. See id. at 194-95 (stating reasons why codetermination may undermine diffuse ownership of stock in German markets).
81. See generally La Porta et al., Law andFinance,supra note 35 (finding correlation between weak protections for investors and weak capital markets).
82. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 32, at 142 (noting that rent-seeking may
cause structures that have become inefficient to remain in place).
83. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 76, at 228 (noting that extraction of
private benefits by blockholders may be facilitated by legal regimes with lax protection of minority shareholder rights).
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the threat of takeovers, which could discourage the investment in firmspecific human capital that is critical to the Japanese system of decentralized decision-making. 84 The lack of an active external labor market in
Japan encourages an active internal labor market, which may in turn aid
the Japanese approach to internal decision-making. 85 Masahiko Aoki has
laid out a variety of other possible such structural inter-connections.8 6 A
different kind of structural effect focuses on how corporate governance
systems are in turn part of a larger economic system. An imperfect corporate governance system may be a second-best adaptation within the
broader economic system. For instance, the weaker focus on shareholder
maximization in Japan and Germany may be a good adaptation in the
87
context of weak product market competition.
Information and learning are a third possible source of system effects.
Investors, both banks and individuals in bond and stock markets, may be
familiar with certain kinds of business organizations and hence more willing to fund such organizations, which in turn leads to more such organizations, thereby reinforcing the greater familiarity with them. 88 Business
people are familiar with certain practices, and the experience of many in
using those practices has helped improve their effectiveness, making untried alternatives a poor risk. Business schools teach methods and ideas
appropriate for a country's dominant system. Lawyers, investment bankers, accountants and management consultants are all important carriers of
established understandings about how businesses should be run. If one is
willing to assert that individuals are not as boundlessly rational as economists usually assume, then the availability heuristic strengthens these infor-

mational effects. The availability heuristic asserts that, rather than using
proper statistical inference from known information, individuals tend to
focus on information that is readily available to them-that is, information
that comes easily and vividly to mind. 89 Thus, even if persons are abstractly aware of other ways of doing business, they may be likely to give
more credence to methods that they have actively experienced themselves.
84. See Aoki, supra note 76, at 25 (noting that main bank monitoring system
avoids hostile takeovers, protecting workers from drastic restructuring).
85. See id. at 23-24 (discussing interconnectedness of weak external and strong
internal labor markets with Japanese internal decision-making system).
86. See id. at 22-27 (discussing potential structural interactions).
87. For a discussion on negative effects of corporate governance models favoring less aggressive shareholder maximization in economies with weak product markets, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
88. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Credit Markets, Learning, and Choice of Alternatives, in LABOR MANAGED FIRMS AND BANKS, supra note 69 (stating that individuals' investment decisions are based on familiarity leading to never-ending cycle of
familiarity driven investment).
89. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982) (explaining availability heuristic).
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Values, norms, and culture represent a fourth source of system effects. One could divide these into broad values and narrow values. Broad
values refer to values that extend well beyond the realm of corporate governance. For instance, Americans typically may be more individualistic
than Japanese, which may help explain the difference between the systems. 90 Note that different corporate systems may in turn help reinforce
cultural differences. Narrow values are values specific to corporate governance. For instance, Japanese and German business people and lawyers
may have a norm against engaging in hostile takeovers.
Thus, Japan and Germany may have formed path-dependent systems.
Banks, firms, financial markets, governmental bureaucracies and laws may
have evolved together. Once in place, no one actor has an incentive to
change the system. A new Japanese corporation could not follow an
American-style entrepreneurial path, since the stock, bond or venture capital markets needed to fund such growth are not well developed. Firms
hook up with main banks instead. Business people expect a certain way of
doing things and adapt to those expectations. Laws help reinforce the
system, and entrenched interests stop those laws from changing. 9 1 The
American system may require an individualism that does not flourish as
well in Japan or Germany as it does in the United States. On this story, the
United States is a path-dependent system as well. Nevertheless, the United
States has managed to find a path superior to that on which Japan and
Germany are stuck.
B.

P2: Japan and Germany Have Evolved Optimally;
the United States Has Not

P2 pictures the Japanese and German systems as more efficient than
the American system. P1 may overstate current problems in Japan. Japanese and German banks might have a stake in enough firms to be adequately diversified. The practice of lending to firms through bank
syndicates may help diversify further.9 2 Though banks prefer that firms
engage in too little risk, shareholders may prefer too much risk. 93 Furthermore, several factors may reduce this conflict. Japanese and German
90. See BRANSON, supra note 33, at 45 ("The U.S. model contemplates a significant role for highly individualistic behavior."); Licht, supra note 34, at 150 ("[A]
nation's unique set of cultural values might indeed affect... development of that
nation's laws in general and its corporate governance system in particular.").
91. Laws may be one part of this self-reinforcing pattern, but not as central as
suggested by Mark Roe's political theory of corporate finance. Laws may be more
effect than cause-laws fitting an American-style system have not developed because no constituencies push for such laws in Japan or Germany.
92. See Toshihiro Horiuchi, The Effect of Firm Status on Banking Relationshipsand
Loan Syndication, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 258, 258-59
(discussing loan syndication and relationship between banks and firms).
93. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications

Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (analyzing
possibility of insolvency effect on risk incentives).
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banks own stock in the firms to which they lend. 94 Moreover, because
banks earn rent by continuing in a long-term relationship with a firm, they
may desire that the firm expand, requiring risky investments, thus increasing their future rent from the firm. 95 The more decentralized and consensual decision-making of Japanese firms may allow them to use much
useful information known by their employees, information that American
firms typically ignore.9 6
The American system also may be weaker than P1 adherents believe.
Takeover, actual or threatened, may only discipline the most ill-behaved of
managers, particularly now that managers know how to put in place effective anti-takeover defenses. Japanese and German banks may intervene
earlier, before a firm's troubles have become extremely serious. 97 Even in

the United States, hostile takeovers were rare before the 1960s, suggesting
they are not so critical a disciplinary mechanism. The external managerial
labor market is also imperfect-often outsiders cannot tell whether a
firm's performance, good or bad, is due to its managers or other causes.
The positive effects of independent boards of directors on firm performance are at this point quite unproven. 98
Just as much American hand wringing in the 1980s may have given
undue weight to temporary, cyclical strong performance in Japan, American triumphalism today may put too much emphasis on differences that
are in part cyclical. Japan's recent poor performance may not reflect deep
structural differences in corporate governance, but more simply some
macroeconomic policy mistakes on the part of Japan's central bank. 99 In
other words, the main difference between Japan and the United States in
the 1990s may have been Alan Greenspan.
American successes may be in other sectors where a different corporate governance regime prevails, not in sectors dominated by large public
corporations. For instance, American success may be due in good part to
high technology firms and the venture capitalist system. 100
94. See Aoki, supra note 7, at 14 (noting thatJapanese banks are permitted to
own stock in nonfinancial companies).
95. See McDonnell, supra note 69.
96. See Aoki, supra note 7, at 3-10 (discussing horizontal coordination and
knowledge sharing among operational units in Japanese firms).
97. See Aoki, supra note 76, at 20-21 (discussing relationship of Japanese firm
and main bank).
98. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 58, at 922 (noting lack of convincing evidence that corporations with majority independent boards out-perform other
corporations).
99. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 76, at 296 (noting that distress in
Pacific markets may be tied to transient movements of stock market averages and
business cycles).
100. However, there too the availability of the American stock markets as an
exit strategy for investors may be crucial to the working of the system. See supra
note 46.
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Japanese and German corporations appear to create less inequality in
pay between top managers and ordinary employees than their American
counterparts. Thus, those who favor an egalitarian distribution of income
and wealth have a reason to oppose the American system. Indeed, even
many in Japan and Germany who think that American-style corporate governance leads to improved efficiency and productivity are somewhat wary
of importing the American system unless it can be made to generate less
inequality.101

Japanese and German corporations may encourage more employee
involvement in internal decision-making than American corporations. In
Germany, employee involvement is legally required through co-determination and works councils. 10 2 Japan has no such laws, butJapanese managers take greater account of employee interests than American managers
do, and Japanese employees may be actively involved in decisions at the
10 3
shop level through innovations such as quality circles.
If the American system is indeed inferior, one must explain why it has
lasted. Again, system effects may explain this. Political effects are a part of
it. Mark Roe has pointed to the Glass-Steagall Act, the National Bank Act
of 1864 and the failure to renew the charter of the Second Bank of the
United States as having shaped the American system. 10 4 There may also
be structural effects. For instance, American start-up firms do not have
Japanese or German-style banks with which to form relationships, and so
turn at a relatively early stage to external markets for financing. Banks
that might want to follow the Japanese or German style, in turn, find it
hard to get started on this path in competition with the bond and stock
markets. The same informational effects as described under P1 would apply here. Value effects appear as well, as American individualism may discourage the degree of cooperation and egalitarianism required under the
Japanese and German system.
C.

P3: The United States Has Taken a Different Path Than Japan and
Germany, But Neither Path Is Clearly Superior

Perhaps labeling an entire national system of corporate finance and
governance as superior is an overly complex, if not nonsensical, task. The
101. See, e.g., David Wessel, Us vs. Them: American Economy Offers a Model Others
Both Envy and Fear, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2001, at Al (noting global ambivalence
toward adoption of American-style economic systems).
102. See Elmar Gerum & Helmut Wagner, Economics of Labor Co-Determination
in View of Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GovERNANCE, supra
note 7, 341, 341 (discussing question of co-determination and employees).
103. SeeAoki, supra note 7, at 8 (noting superior utilization of on-site information to realize organizational goals in Japanese firms).
104. See ROE, supra note 28, at 21-49 (discussing impact of political forces on
development of modern American corporate form).
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American,Japanese and German systems all work well. Each has strengths
10 5
and weaknesses, some of which P1 and P2 set out.
Even looking at each of our three values (efficiency, distributional
equity and participation) separately, comparisons may be hard. How does
one make Kaldor-Hicks efficiency comparisons when the two systems differ on such a variety of points, and where the American system has some
advantages and the Japanese and German system has different advantages?10 6 Simply comparing national Gross National Product (GNP) levels
will not do, as there are a host of other differences between the countries
that may swamp the effects of differences in corporate governance. Moreover, GNP is a notoriously imperfect measure of national well-being in any
case. 107

In making comparisons with respect to equity and participation, there
are problems both in determining the factual effect of corporate governance systems on these values and in determining what outcomes are best
under these values. Does equity favor greater equality, or rather does it
favor compensation based on talent and hard work? Does greater participation suggest we should focus on equal participation within large organizations, such as corporations, as Germany and Japan arguably achieve?
Or, should we focus on allowing people to more easily create competing
organizations, a virtue of the American system?
Furthermore, the recognition of a variety of values creates the possibility that these may point in different ways. For instance, perhaps efficiency favors the American system, while equity and participation favor
Japan and Germany. We may find it hard then to say that either system is
clearly superior. Those who care strongly about efficiency may favor the
United States while those who care strongly about equality may favorJapan
or Germany. To the extent that cultural values differ nationally and are in
part endogenous to the systems, it may be that those raised in the American system find this system best. The same would hold true for those
raised under Japanese or German values. This possibility may hold even
though there is broad agreement on the facts of how the two systems compare along the various dimensions of interest.
Another possibility is that each system is best within its national context. For one thing, a corporate governance system is itself just part of a
105. For a summary of the effects of different governance systems on firm

performance that reaches a mixed verdict, see generally MARIA MAHER & THOMAS
ANDERSSON, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org (examining corporate governance systems and their implications in OECD countries).
106. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 76, at 219 (noting that interdependencies among components within each system act as barrier to cross references

between systems).
107. See, e.g., MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS 57 (1988) (noting that GNP fails to account for working conditions and some
non-market activity).
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broader economic system. The second-best arguments suggesting that
changing just one part of an overall system may not be good may then
apply to the corporate governance system as a whole. 108 More prosaically,
each system may just be an optimal adaptation to the historical, resource,
economic, political and cultural environment of the countries in which it
is followed.
Under P3 one must still explain why the countries remain on separate
paths. The same sorts of path-dependent mechanisms as suggested under
P1 and P2 apply here. Perhaps path dependence arguments are rather
stronger here, where no system is clearly superior so one might well expect
less pressure for either system to move toward the other. If one thinks that
each system is simply an optimal adaptation within the broader socioeconomic system of each country, then to explain the persistence of difference one would need to take a broader historical and social look at the
differences between the countries.
D.

P4: The United States, Germany and Japan Are Roughly Similar

The first three stories all assume that the American system differs fundamentally from that in Japan and Germany. Perhaps they do not. Perhaps instead their differences are mere variations on a theme. George
Triantis and Ronald Daniels argue that banks play a bigger role in governing American firms than generally thought, suggesting much similarity
with Japan.10 9 Other institutional investors, such as pensions and mutual
funds, to some extent in the American system, may also play the role of
banks in the Japanese and German systems.' 10 Takeovers may not be such
a big difference-though takeovers are less likely in Japan than the United
States. Until the 1960s, they were rare in the United States as well, so
perhaps they are not such a central part of the American system. On the
other side, it is not as if stock and bond markets are totally undeveloped in
Japan and Germany. Indeed, they are active relative to most of the rest of
108. For a discussion on second-best problems arising when comparisons are
made based on one piece within a system, see supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
109. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
CorporateGovernance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073, 1080-82 (1995) (discussing role of lenders within system of corporate governance).
110. In the early 1990s, there was much discussion about whether American
institutional investors might be becoming, or able to become, more actively involved in corporate governance. See, e.g., Bernard Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 529-30 (1990) (recognizing role of institutions in
shareholder voting); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1279 (1991) (noting that

American organizational form has evolved to resemble German orJapanese industrial system); Edmund B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447-53 (1991) (discussing role of institutional
investors in corporate governance).
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the world.1 11 It is possible that the countries may differ significantly in
formal legal rules, but in function, the systems work quite similarly.
Sectoral differences within countries may be greater than differences between countries. For example, an American venture capital startup is governed far differently than an American large, long-established public
corporation.' 12
A variant of P4 holds that the three countries are on the same path,
but that Japan and Germany lag behind the United States on that path.
On this view, shareholder protections in Japan and Germany lag behind
those in the United States, so their stock markets are not as well-developed; however, they are moving in the United States' direction, and doing
so in a way that roughly resembles how stock markets developed in the
United States itself.1 13 After all, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the United States was characterized by more concentrated shareholding than now with at least some role for powerful banks involved in
114
corporate governance-thinkJ.P. Morgan.
These four stories are ideal types. Reality involves some blend of
them. Japanese, German and American firms are more or less alike in
some ways, and more or less different in others. In some ways, American
firms perform better, and in other ways, Japanese and German firms do a
better job. Theory is clear; life is a muddle.
IV.

FOUR

STORIES OF THE FUTURE

In this section, I present four stories as to where corporations in Japan, Germany and the United States may be headed in the future. Again,
the stories are ideal types. In this section, I do not explore the connection
between these four future stories and the four past stories presented in the
previous section; I save that task for the next section.
A.

Fl:Japan and Germany Will Move Toward the Path Currently Followed
by the United States

Perhaps Japan and Germany will come to resemble the American system. There are signs of such change. The change could involve changing
laws or creating new institutional patterns. John Coffee calls the former
111. For a discussion on behavior of the banking industry's role in monitoring corporate governance, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
112. For an argument that this is becoming the case for employment practices, though it has not been so in the past, see HARRY C. KATZ & OWEN DARBISHIRE,
CONVERGING DIVERGENCES: WORLDWIDE CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS 269-75
(2000) (noting sectional differences as major factor of within-country variation in
employment systems).
113. See COFFEE, supra note 20, at 17-18 (noting similarities in evolution of
American and German stock markets).
114. See id. at 31 (explaining thatJ.P. Morgan & Company Investment Bank
held many directorships in nineteenth century businesses).
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"formal convergence" and the latter "functional convergence." ' 1 5 Japanese firms increasingly use bonds, replacing bank loans. 116 Though main
banks often underwrite corporate bonds, using bonds rather than loans
presumably weakens the banks' influence. The pattern of cross-stockholding among firms and banks may also be loosening.1 17 In Germany, recent
tax law changes are expected to dramatically reduce the shares of firms
held or controlled by banks.1 18 Banking regulation reform in Japan is
intended to make the functioning of banks more transparent and to address the soft budget constraint problem of banks failing to foreclose on
bad loans. 119 There has been some growth of venture capital financing
and firms going public at a relatively young age in both Germany and
Japan. 120 Organizations and companies in many countries, including Japan and Germany, have adopted corporate governance guidelines, which
1 21
tend to focus on American-style active board monitoring.
Note that F1 does not specify that the American system is superior to
the opposing system. Thus, it is possible that P2 could be true-that is,
that Japan and Germany have evolved optimally while the United States
has not, and yet Japan and Germany will in the future come to resemble
the American system. Section V will explore this and similar possibilities
further.
B.

F2: The United States Will Move Toward the Path Currently Followed
by Japan and Germany

Perhaps instead the United States will come to resemble Japan and
Germany. There are signs of this change too. The wall separating banking and commerce has crumbled dramatically. Large pieces of the GlassSteagall Act have been eliminated, although the prohibition on commer115. See id. at 4 (defining "formal convergence" as "convergence to common
legal rules and practices").
116. See Masahiko Aoki, Monitoring Characteristicsof the Main Bank System: An
Analytical and Developmental View, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM, supra note
12, at 108, 135 (noting that "firms have come increasingly to rely on bond issues, at
home and abroad").
117. See Ever So Polite:Japan'sPolite CorporateRaiders,ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2001,
at 63-64 (recognizing shift in Japanese corporate culture toward increasingly hostile takeovers).
118. See Matthew Valencia, Cross About Holdings: Europe's Ownership Structures
Are Being Re-examined, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, at 52 (noting that elimination of
punishing capital gains tax will lead to replacement of institutional shareholders
with active individual investors).
119. See Seriously?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2001, at 78 (noting that foreclosure
and bad loans will lead to "painful reform").
120. See Panik? Germans Still Love Shares, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 72 (not-

ing that German investors are still providing financing even though initial public
offerings and "high profile share issues" have decreased).
121. See supra note 58 and infra note 177.
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cial banks owning stock remains in a weakened form.1 22 Many American
firms have taken on a debt-equity ratio resembling that of Japanese and
German firms. MichaelJensen argues that leveraged buyouts have created
a corporate form resembling that ofJapan.' 23 Institutional investors, such
as pensions and mutual funds, may come to take the active monitoring
role of banks in the Japanese and German system. 124 As with Fl, the
change may involve formal or functional convergence.
C.

F3: The United States, Japan and Germany Will Converge
to a Hybrid Form

F1 noted signs of Japanese and German firms moving towards an
American pattern; F2 noted signs of the reverse. Maybe they will meet in
the middle. 125 The increasing internationalization of corporate finance
might lead people in each country to copy the others' best practices. 126 A
hybrid system might combine the advantages of both systems. Of course,
it might combine the disadvantages of both systems too. Another possibility is that each country will contain firms that follow different sorts of gov127
ernance practices.
F3 must contend with the theory that the two corporate governance
systems are complex systems of inter-dependent parts and organizations,
which have adapted to fit each other. Changing one part may be hard to
do without changing other parts as well.' 28 A hybrid may not be possible,
122. See Randall S. Kroszner, The Legacy of the Separation of Banking and Commerce Continues in Gramm-Leach-Bliley, REGION, 1 2-4 (June 2000), at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/regioin/00-06/kroszner.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2002)
(arguing that Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 has not
eliminated all restrictions against banks from investing in nonfinancial
enterprises).
123. SeeJensen, supra note 27, at 61 (arguing that takeovers, corporate breakups and leveraged buyouts, among other things, display organizational change in
economy).
124. For a further discussion of this possibility, see sources cited supra note
110.
125. Aoki suggests this as one possibility. See Aoki, supra note 76, at 33-36
(noting different scenarios regarding convergence ofJapanese and Western corporate governance systems).
126. There is a rather extensive business school literature on international
best practices and how corporations are looking to and adopting the best practices
of corporations from around the world in a number of areas of management. For
some recent work on this question, see Michael R. Czinkota & Ilkka A. Ronkainen,
Globalization:An Introduction and Assessment of Realities and Strategies, in BEST PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1, 2 (Michael R. Czinkota & Ilkka A. Rankainen
eds., 2001) (noting that international customers are demanding products that
draw from worldwide best practices).
127. See KATz & DARBISHIRE, supra note 112, at 265 (noting that different economic pressures across countries and industries lead to employment system
variation).
128. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 76, at 220 (stating that changing
incentive patterns could destabilize working arrangements). Aoki also suggests
this as a possibility. See Aoki, supra note 76, at 16 (describing rank hierarchy in
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or it may be very unattractive. I will deal with this possibility further in the
next section.
D.

F4: The United States Might Remain, or Become, Distinct
from Japan and Germany

Perhaps whatever has kept the two systems distinct to date, assuming
they are distinct, will continue to keep them distinct in the future. Although F1 and F2 point to signs of change, those changes may not go far.
Perhaps the economy is not becoming all that global after all. In many
ways the nineteenth century's economy was as global as today's economy.
Law may prevent convergence. Or, path-dependent features of complex
systems now adapted to certain forms may prevent change and
129
convergence.
Indeed, certain features, which have historically been similar, may diverge. A recent study of corporate law provisions in the United States and
Japan suggests that such divergence has indeed occurred over the past few
130
decades for some provisions.
For convenience, I summarize P1 through P4 and F1 through F4 in
Table 1.
V.

RELATING PAST AND FUTURE STORIES

Section III set out four stories of how the two systems of corporate governance came to evolve to their current states. Section IV set out four
stories of where the systems of corporate governance may be headed.
Conceivably, each past story could be combined with each one of the future stories, leading to sixteen different possible combinations. These
combinations are set out in Table 2.131 This section will explore the different possibilities. It will consider in more depth the possible mechanisms of evolution that may guide corporate governance systems.
Although in the end I tentatively advance which combination I think is
most likely, the main point is that there are a wide variety of possibilities,
and at this point neither theory nor empirical evidence gives persuasive
reason to rule out any of the possible combinations.
Japanese businesses). For a detailed discussion of corporate governance systems,
see supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
129. See Aoki, supra note 76, at 35 (noting possibility that differences between
Japanese and Western business models are problematical).
130. See MARK D. WEST, THE PUZZLING DIVERGENCE OF CORPORATE LAw: EviDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS FROM JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (University of

Michigan Law School Law and Economics Research, Working Paper No. 00-011,
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract_id=251028 (describing recent divergence between United States Model Business Corporation Act and
Japanese Commercial Code despite having base in same act).
131. By relying so prominently on a grid table such as Table 2, I hope to be
doing my bit to promote inter-disciplinary work with sociology. I trust that using a
4x4 rather than a 2x2 table still fits within the spirit of that discipline.

368

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 341

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE STORIES

P1

Stories of the Past
The United States has evolved optimally; Japan and Germany have not

P2 Japan and Germany have evolved optimally; the United States has not
P3

The United States has taken a different path than Japan and Germany,
but neither path is clearly superior

P4

The United States, Germany and Japan are roughly similar
Stories of the Future

F1 Japan and Germany will move toward the path currently followed by the
United States
F2 The United States will move toward the path currently followed by Japan
and Germany
F3
F4

The United States, Japan and Germany will converge to a hybrid form
The United States might remain, or become, distinct from Japan and
Germany

I consider the sixteen combinations in turn.
A.

P1-

Fl

13 2
This is the dominant story of American triumphalist convergence.
The discussion of P1 in Section III presented reasons to consider the
American system superior. The arguments are most persuasive if one focuses on efficiency as a value. Over the last decade, American firms have
tended to out-perform firms elsewhere in profitability, growth and innovation.13 3 The role of venture capitalists in Silicon Valley makes a particularly strong case for American superiority in corporate governance and
corporate finance (granted, this sentence is less compelling now than it
would have been in January 2000).
Given P1, the argument for F1 draws on notions of evolution and
globalization. In today's economy, large corporations must increasingly
compete with each other for both capital and sales. Firms that are less
efficiently organized will lose this competition.' 3 4 As multinational firms,
investment banks, management consultants and the like spread around

132. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 468 (stating that standard
corporate model is dominant legal model in every jurisdiction); see also GILSON,
supra note 21, at 17 (noting that active venture capital market, typical of American
system, has lead other countries to replicate its success); Coffee, supra note 20, at
642 ("[C]onventional governance norms in the United States may be more the
product of a path dependant history than the 'natural' result of an inevitable
evolution toward greater efficiency.").
133. See A.K.N. Ahmed, World Economic Scenario: A Critique of Models, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 21, 2000, 2000 WL 6306630 (comparing United States, Germany and
Japan in terms of growth, productivity and job creation over ten year period).
134. For a more detailed discussion of this standard story in contemporary
corporate law scholarship, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

F1

F2

P1

American triumphalist convergence

Converge to
inferior Japanese-German
system

P2

Converge to
inferior American system

Converge to
superior Japanese-German
system

P3

Converge to
American system
though not
clearly superior

Converge to Japanese-German
system though
not clearly superior

P4 Japan and Ger- Japan, Germany
and the United
many, already
on same path as States remain
on same path
the United
States, catch up

F3

F4

Superior American system and
inferior Japanese-German
system converge
to hybrid
Superior Japanese-German
system and
inferior American system converge to hybrid

Inferior Japanese-German
system remains
on separate
path

Two non-comparable systems
converge to
hybrid

Non-comparable
systems remain
on separate
paths

Japan, Germany
and the United
States remain
on same path

Currently similar systems
diverge or,
United States
stays ahead of
others though
on same path

Inferior American system
remains on separate path

the world, America's best practices can and will be learned and copied in
other countries. Governments will increasingly feel forced to change laws
that do not fit well with evolving institutions or else face the decline of
their nation's largest businesses. Of course, such legal changes may lag
behind other changes-to use Coffee's terminology, "functional conver3 5
gence" may be quicker than "formal convergence."'
There is some evidence of a move towards the American system. The
discussion of F1 in Section IV briefly presents some of that evidence. A
number of observers in Japan, Germany and other parts of Europe seem
to believe that the American system has demonstrated such strength over
the past decade that their countries must follow the American lead or else
fall further behind.136 The convergence thesis suggests that this trend will
continue. 137
135. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 657 (stating possibility that "functional convergence" may trump "formal convergence").
136. See Lydia Lim, Japan Must Restructure to Compete, STRAITs TIMEs, Feb. 16,
2000, 2000 WL 2965472 (claiming that Germany and Japan will have to change
methods of investing capital and labor and delivery services to compete with
United States).
137. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 455 (suggesting that weaker
economic systems will continue to converge to American system).
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PI - F2

This combination looks odd. It maintains that the United States has
followed a path superior to that of Japan and Germany, but nonetheless
that the United States will converge to that other, inferior path. How
could that happen?
We have already considered system-theoretic stories about how corporate governance systems may come to follow non-optimal paths. 138 What
happens when two such systems come to confront each other in international competition? No one really knows, but it is not necessarily clear
that the superior system must win. At issue is the relative strength of the
system mechanisms described above versus the strength of forces favoring
the selection of a superior system and the direction of those selective
forces. Selective forces need not necessarily select the best system overall.
For instance, one system may possess properties that are not socially superior but that help firms using that system to thrive in competition with
other firms. Many characterized Japanese firms in the 1970s and 1980s as
ignoring the needs of shareholders and focusing on market share. 139
Such an approach may be inefficient, but firms following such an approach may for a long time gain market share over firms following a more
shareholder-friendly path. If this process is strong and fast enough, perhaps American firms might be forced to follow the Japanese model or else
go under. There seems little prospect of this now, but it seemed possible,
indeed probable to some, in the late 1980s, and it is conceivable that tides
could shift again.
Another possibility draws on the systemic effects of informational
forces considered above. Perhaps parties (both firms and investors) in the
competing systems are comparing and contrasting the approaches and
choosing the approach that appears superior. Although this might suggest that the superior system should win out, it is not necessarily so. If the
inferior system has a run of good luck and the superior system a run of
bad luck, the inferior system might come to appear superior. Parties
might then shift to adopting the inferior system, until the superior system
drifts towards oblivion. Some think that this sort of story is important in
the adoption of competing technologies; perhaps it could happen in the
adoption of competing systems of corporate governance as well.' 40 If the

United States is superior and Japan and Germany are inferior this does
138. For a discussion of corporate governance systems, see supra notes 80-87
and accompanying text.
139. See Dan Fenno Henderson, Security Markets in the United States andJapan:
Distinctive Aspects Molded by Cultural, Social, Economic and PoliticalDifferences, 14 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 263, 281 (noting thatJapanese corporations pay more
attention to market share than shareholders).
140. See W. Brian Arthur & David Lane, Information Contagion, 4 STRUCTURAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMic

DvNAMics 81 (1993) (noting that investors will tend to

favor those ideas and systems that have readily available information and are widely
discussed). See generally Robin Cowan, Tortoises and Hares: Choice Among Technologies
of Unknown Merit, 101 ECON. J. 801 (1991) (discussing adoption process scenarios
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not seem a particularly likely current scenario, but again it may have come
close to happening in the eighties.
Another possibility leading to this scenario is that the political forces
opposing change are stronger in Japan and Germany than in the United
States. Those political forces could use the state to prevent American
firms from entering Japanese or German markets and gaining an advantage there, while using governmental subsidies to help Japanese or German firms succeed in American markets. Again, this was a real fear for
many Americans in the eighties, although it seems less plausible now.
C.

P1 - F3

This possibility is something of a mix of the two just considered. According to it, the American system has evolved as the superior system, but
it and its alternative shall converge to a hybrid system. This story has several possible variants.
On one variant, although the American system is overall superior,
there may be specific features of the Japanese and German systems that
are preferable to their American counterparts. An optimistic theory of
evolution towards best practices may claim that each system, American,
Japanese and German, will adapt to take on specific features of other systems that complement and enhance the current best practice system. For
instance, American firms in the 1980s and 1990s to at least some extent,
adapted Japanese just in time production techniques. American firms, to
a limited extent, may have moved towards the heavier use of outsourcing,
1 41
a typical practice of Japanese manufacturers.
On another variant, the hybrid to which both systems are converging
does not necessarily represent the optimal way of doing things for each
element within the hybrid system. It may be that some elements of, the
corporate governance system are strongly enough inter-related that it is
not possible or desirable to change one of those elements without ,changing the others as well. 1 42 Some parts of the system, though, may be less
inter-dependent and hence more adaptable in response to the practices of
other systems. On this story, the United States may take some Japanese
elements, such as just in time production, which turn out to be easily
adaptable. The United States would retain other elements, such as relatively weak shareholder monitoring. While certain practices in theory
might be undesirable, they are closely linked to other elements, such as
active stock markets, which are in many other ways quite attractive. Japan
and Germany, in turn, will change their systems more drastically in order
relating to technology). The triumph of VHS over Beta in the videotape market is
a frequently cited example.
141. The literature on international best practices suggests such a processindeed; it is itself part of such a process. See supra note 126.

142. The potential undesirability of piecemeal change in a sub-optimal system
is a consequence of the theory of the second best. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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to reach the hybrid system in an attempt to remain internationally
competitive.
A more lurid possibility is that the systems will converge to a hybrid
featuring the worst of both systems. International markets could undermine the needed disciplinary mechanisms of both systems. In Japan and
Germany, banks lose influence as the best companies turn to international
stock and bond markets. 143 In the United States, needed securities law
protections are lost as companies engage in regulatory arbitrage to evade
those securities laws. I doubt we are headed there, but we should not dismiss this possibility out of hand.

D.

P1- F4

This story suggests that strong forces will keep the systems on separate
paths. 144 Even though the system in Japan and Germany is inferior and
doing poorly in international competition with the United States, it will
persist. All four of the systems factors might cause this. Entrenched political interests may favor the present system and oppose changes required to
move to the American system. There is certainly evidence of this today in
Japan. 1 45 Many both in and outside of Japan believe that Japanese banks
need to be reformed so that they stop propping up companies that deserve to die. 1 46 There have been some attempts to achieve such reform. 147 The attempts, however, have been relatively feeble, and the

ruling party appears unable so far to overcome the political obstacles to
reform.

1 48

There are structural reasons to expect that Japan and Germany will
not come to look like a mirror image of the United States. It may be that
many parts of the corporate governance system need to be changed more
or less simultaneously in order to succeed. No one individual actor may
have the ability or the incentive to direct all the changes that must be
made, and coordinated change may be impractically costly. Moreover,
143. See generally Aoki, supra note 116 (comparingJapanese Main Bank System
to other governance systems and questioning whether Japanese system possesses
best practices).
144. In particular, it suggests that these forces are stronger than the forces
pushing for evolution to an optimal system. See supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
145. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory ofJapanese Corporate Governance:
Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 3, 49 (1996) (claiming that

unstable political system impedes regulatory reform).
146. See Dafei Chen, Acute Symptoms of Chronic Problems:Japan'sProcrastination
in Solving Its Banking Crisis, the Current Situation and a Future Perspective, 9 MINN. J.

269, 283-84 (2000) (noting that more regulation of banks' bad debt
is needed).
147. See id. at 280-85 (discussing Japan's past, present and future attempts at
banking reform).
148. See id. at 291 (claiming that Japan must be prepared to take politically
painful steps to save economy).
GLOBAL TRADE
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changing corporate governance in its entirety may be sub-optimal if the
rest of the economic system remains unchanged.
Informational effects may also be at work. Although with globalization and the Internet people in Japan and Germany are more aware of the
American way of business than they were in the past, there are still significant differences in the knowledge and experiential base of people in the
United States versus people in Japan and Germany. Linguistic differences
1 49
may make those differences hard to overcome.
A final obstacle to convergence may be national differences in values
and culture. Values and culture may be deep-seated enough that they are
quite hard to change.1 5 0 Moreover, basic values affect far more in society
than corporate governance, and it may not be worth changing such values
just because corporations might be better governed if citizens had different values. If value and cultural differences are crucial to the differences
between systems, this factor alone may be enough to block
convergence.151

E.

P2 -F1

According to this story, Japan and Germany have evolved a system
superior to that of the United States, and yet they will converge to the
American system. 152 It thus shares some of the facial oddness of P1 - F2,
149. The linguistic point may be stronger forJapan than it is for Germany.
150. See BRANSON, supra note 33, at 45 (analyzing cultural challenges to convergence in China and Indonesia); Licht, supra note 34, at 164 (noting that culture
is strong impediment to change).
151. I am not inclined to put too much emphasis on values and culture in
explaining the differences between the United States, Japan and Germany in corporate governance. For instance, the differences between the United States and
Japan largely seem to have a modern origin, reflecting political choices in the years
after World War II. See Aoki, supra note 7, at 2 (questioning importance ofJapan's
culture on management of its firms); Gilson & Roe, supra note 31, at 265-66 (discussing human capital requirements during post-World War II labor shortage and
noting that United States had fixed wages and mobile jobs while Japan had fixed
employment and variable wages). Nevertheless, value differences may well be
more important in explaining differences between the United States and less developed countries.
152. Note that Hansmann and Kraakman consider the possibility that countries will converge to American practices which are in some ways non-optimal.
They specifically point to international agreement as to limited liability for torts,
which they attacked in an earlier article. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879 (1991) (discussing consequences of limited corporate tort liability). On that
particular point, I share the skepticism that has met their argument. They also
point to another way in which we may be converging to a non-optimal outcome,
which way is more significant to this Article. They note that in some ways the
American system may give too much unchecked power to managers, particularly in
their ability to defend against hostile takeovers. They describe this as "a slight
managerialist tilt." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 467. One could instead characterize Delaware takeover law as a full-fledged capitulation to managerial power.
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discussed above. Some of the points made in that discussion apply here as
well. For instance, in comparing systems one may appear superior for
temporary reasons but come to dominate as parties adopt that system and
become familiar with it. The current apparent efficiency of the American
system may be a fad based on a long run of American good luck andJapanese bad luck with the business cycle. IfJapan does succeed in fundamentally changing its system, it may find it hard to go back, so that temporary
153
bad luck has permanent consequences.
There may also be features of the Japanese and German systems that
make these systems vulnerable to competition with the American system
even though the American system does not always work as well. For instance, it might be that banks require limits on competition from certain
kinds of capital markets. An adverse selection process currently seems to
be occurring (in the United States as well as Japan) whereby the best large
corporations are turning to bond markets rather than banks for debt financing. 154 It could be that ultimately bond markets do a poorer job of
monitoring corporate behavior, but the presence of such markets may
nonetheless make it much harder for banks to do theirjobs well. This is a
possible argument for governments not encouraging some capital markets, as indeed may have been the case in Japan and Germany. Nevertheless, once markets in the United States become available to international
corporations, effective regulation by national governments becomes quite
difficult. Note how this possibility turns Coffee's argument on functional
convergence on its head: international capital markets may indeed help
encourage functional convergence, but the result is a race to the bottom,
not the top.
Another possibility is that Japan and Germany are superior to the
United States on non-efficiency-based grounds, but that (a possibly temporary) apparent American superiority in efficiency and productivity is stampeding Japan and Germany into a regrettable imitation of the United
States. Ronald Dore takes a position along these lines, although he thinks
155
there is hope that Japan, at least, will resist the American siren song.
F. P2 -F2
On this story, the Japanese-German system is superior and the American system will converge to it. The same forces of evolution and globaliza153. Of course, it is instead possible that the American run will end and perceptions will change before any permanent changes are made. Indeed, there are
already some signs of changing perceptions.
154. SeeA Survey of CorporateFinance,ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2001, at 11, 20 (suggesting that effects on market due to technological advances may cause corporations to borrow more from bond market).
155. See

RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM: JA-

PAN AND GERMANY VERSUS THE ANGLO-SAXONS

221-39 (2000) (suggesting thatJapan

is more likely than Germany to combat adopting American ways because of its
strong cultural ideals, "holistic" corporate thinking and its neighboring countries'
practices).
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tion discussed above under P1 - F1 are relevant here. The only difference
is that on this story it is Japan and Germany, rather than the United States,
which possess the superior system. The discussion of P2 in Section III
above canvasses some reasons why the American system may be inferior.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, there was some evidence, and much
speculation, that this story was occurring.156 Japanese firms in particular
seemed to be out-competing American firms in a number of areas, and
many commentators noted that Japanese and German banks may do a
better job of solving corporate agency and coordination problems than
American capital markets do. 157 The story seems a bit quaint today, after
a decade ofJapanese travail and American triumph. One should not base
conclusions as to the relative superiority or inferiority of corporate governance systems, however, on the evidence of just one decade. The 1980s
may have been a fad, but then again, perhaps the 1990s were the fad and
the 1980s were the real deal.
G.

P2 -F3

This is similar to P1 - F3, described above; and like it, P2 - F3 has a
couple of variants. In one, although the Japanese-German system is overall superior, the American system does have some good practices, and
both are converging to a hybrid that combines the best practices of both.
For instance, the current banking problem in Japan may be solvable by
tougher, more American-style banking regulation and the government refusing to bail out troubled banks and companies. 15 8 IfJapanese banks did
not have overly-friendly regulators to fall back on they might be more
likely to pull the plug on failed companies, causing the system to work
better. It is hard to see many signs of the United States presently converging to much of the Japanese-German system, but again, that could be an
accident of temporary American good luck.
The other variant of this story has the Japanese system adopting some
American best practices that are not incompatible or undesirable within
the context of the main Japanese system, but rejecting other American
practices that, while perhaps desirable on their own, do not fit in the Japanese system. For instance, while hostile takeovers may be attractive as a
disciplinary mechanism, they may be inconsistent with the degree of main
bank control required to make the Japanese system work.
156. See, e.g.,

KATz

& DARBISHIRE, supra note 112, at 169 (proposing that Ger-

many was more stable than other industrialized countries during 1980s).
157. See Roe, supra note 28, at 59-60 (remarking that Japanese and German
banks are not only more heavily involved in commerce than American banks, but
also control large amounts of stock and daily corporate affairs).
158. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 32 at 136-37 (examining breakdown of
Japanese banking system in context of similarities and differences between corpo-

rate ownership and governance structures).
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P2 -F4

As with P1 - F4 above, here an inferior system remains stuck on its
path despite being in competition with a superior system. The only difference is that here the inferior system is that of the United States. The same
sorts of mechanisms may block divergence, including interest group opposition, structural inter-relationships, culture and values. Mark Roe's work
on the political origins of American corporate finance surveys some of the
1 59
relevant political forces.
I. P3 -F1
In this square, neither system can clearly be said to be superior, but
the Japanese-German system will nonetheless converge to the American.
The factors discussed in P2 - F1 above are relevant here too in explaining
this convergence. Beyond these, here there is another possible consideration. It could be that the two systems cannot be decisively compared in
part due to conflicting values. The American system may be more efficient while the Japanese-German system creates greater equality and/or
greater participation. Perhaps the evolutionary and competitive pressures
towards convergence focus mainly on the relative efficiency of competing
alternatives. If so, evolution may favor the American system because of its
greater efficiency. Economic natural selection may ignore the values of
equality and participation.
J.

P3 - F2

In this case, neither system can clearly be said to be superior, but the
American system will converge to that of its competitors. The factors discussed in P1 - F2 above are relevant here too in explaining this convergence. Beyond these, I suppose there is a conceivable consideration
parallel to that just considered for convergence to the American system.
Perhaps the pressures towards convergence could turn out to be political
rather than economic and focus on the values of equality and participation rather than efficiency. If so, and ifJapan and Germany excel in those
political values, then convergence would favor their system. This story,
though, would imply an American political revolt against the concentrated
economic and political power of corporate managers. It is a logical possibility. Another possibility is that the American system is inferior in terms
of efficiency, but superior in encouraging participation and in anti-egalitarian distributional values. Hence, economic evolutionary forces favor the
more efficient Japanese and German system.
159. See Roe, supra note 28, at 31-53 (noting that all elements, such as American public opinion and ideology, interest group politics and American political
institutions, combine to affect outcome of political story).
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K. P3 -F3
This alternative maintains that the two systems cannot be clearly
ranked, either because one does better with some values and the other
does better with others, or because even when looking only at efficiency,
both solve the problems corporations face more or less equally well. In
the future, they will converge to a hybrid. The most important variant
maintains that this hybrid will combine the best practices of the two different systems. In doing so, it suggests that the four kinds of system effects,
which may give rise to path dependence, can be overcome. Perhaps informational effects have been particularly important-the two systems have
remained different up until now in large part because the different parties
in each system have become familiar with their own systems' ways of doing
things. However, with growing globalization, economic actors can now
learn from other countries, thereby overcoming the informational effects.
Globalization may also reduce some structural impediments to change.
Parties in one country can now more easily interact with and be supported
by institutions in other countries. Banks and capital markets need not be
incompatible alternatives. Indeed, in important ways, banks can benefit
from access to sophisticated capital markets, and capital markets in turn
work better with active, sophisticated banks serving as monitors and financial intermediaries. 160 Even political opposition to change may eventually
melt away as it becomes clear that countries failing to adapt will lose their
economic position in the world. Values too may be malleable, or they may
not be important to the differences between corporate governance systems. The Japanese corporate system, for instance, seems to be largely a
creation of the post-World War II era; the expression of ancient Asian values may not play as large a part in Japanese corporations. 161 A variant of
this position is that, although the United States has differed systematically
from Japan and Germany in the past, we are moving to a future where the
differences between firms within all three countries will be much greater
1 62
than the differences between the countries overall.
L.

P3 -F4

This scenario agrees with the starting point of the previous ones: the
two systems cannot be clearly ranked. However, it maintains that the
160. See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 7, at 47-76 (comparing roles of banks and
markets in different countries and influence these financial systems have on countries' economies).
161. See Aoki, supra note 7, at 14-17 (exploring birth and adaptation of Japanese financial structures); Gilson & Roe, supra note 31, at 251-54 (discussing how
post-World War II political efforts shaped how labor and corporate governance
institutions developed in Japan).
162. See KATZ & DARBIsHIRE, supra note 112, at 270-72 (finding, for example,
factors such as centralization by unions and employers' associations, commonality
of decentralized processes and power and degree of effective coordination among
actors all contribute to international variation among firms).
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forces preventing the systems from changing dramatically are stronger
than those pushing towards convergence. Concentrated shareholder,
bank-centered monitoring may just not be consistent with dispersed shareholder, capital market-centered corporate governance. 163 The political
resistance of entrenched interests in each system may be too strong to
budge. 164 Deep-seated value differences may not be moved by the competition of corporate governance systems, and they may be important in explaining the persistence of different systems.1 6 5 Informational differences
may not be easily erased, even in our new global economy. It may also be
that the competitive pressures creating a tendency to evolve to the best
system may not be as strong as some suppose. For instance, pressure created by the need for external capital may be overstated, as most large firms
rely mainly on retained earnings to finance most of their investment.
M.

P4 -F1

P4, you may recall, maintains that the three countries are already on
the same basic path. On one variant, there are already few fundamental
differences between them. Given this starting point, it would seem natural
to predict that the countries will remain similar in the future. None of the
future stories articulated here fits particularly well with this story, as they
appear to assume different starting points for the two systems. However, I
assume this might be termed Japan and Germany moving toward the path
currently followed by the United States, although it might just as well be
called the United States moving toward the Japanese-German path or both
moving toward a hybrid, in the sense that all these paths are the same,
given P4.
Another variant of P4 states that the countries are on the same basic
path, but the United States is further along on that path. On this variant,
P4 - F1 can be read to state that Japan and Germany will eventually catch
up to the United States. Thus, this is a version of the American triumphalist story; it is, however, a less interesting version in that it maintains that
Japan and Germany never posed a real alternative to the United States in
166
the first place. Coffee may fit this description.
163. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 76, at 289-92 (arguing that concentrated shareholder and dispersed shareholder schemes are inconsistent on several
levels).
164. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 32, at 142 (stating that changing ownership structure is difficult because controlling parties will try to impede change).
165. See BRANSON, supranote 33, at 6 (arguing there will never be global convergence because American capitalism and corporate governance will never

change governmental and societal barriers); Licht, supra note 34, at 147 (stating
that culture plays role in development of corporate governance systems).
166. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 646-48 (discussing variations in convergence
theories).
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N.

P4 - F2

This scenario says the three countries are already on the same path,
and that the United States will move to the path currently followed by
Japan and Germany. As just stated under P4 - Fl, this could be seen as
simply another way of saying they will stay on the same path. Otherwise,
this combination does not seem to have a plausible interpretation.

0.

P4 -F3

This scenario says the three countries are already on the same path
and that they will converge to a hybrid. As with P4 - F2, the only way of
making sense of this scenario is as simply saying that they will remain on
the same path.
P.

P4 - F4

This final scenario says that the three countries are roughly similar,
but that the United States might remain, or become, distinct from Japan
and Germany. It has two possible interpretations.
In one, P4 is used in the variant that the United States is ahead of the
other countries on their common path. P4 - F4 could then mean that the
United States will remain ahead of Japan and Germany on this path. Japan and Germany may continue to learn from and imitate American innovations in corporate governance, but never fully catch up with the leader.
In the other interpretation, the three countries are on the same path,
but in the future, they will diverge and actually evolve into distinctly different systems. On both efficiency/evolutionary and path dependence theories, it is rather hard to see how this might happen. Mark West, however,
has an interesting recent empirical study of corporate law provisions that
suggests that precisely this has happened in the evolution of those provisions in the United States and Japan over the past fifty years.' 67 Perhaps
what is true of those legal provisions may become true of the countries'
overall systems. West's findings can be interpreted in a different way. The
initially similar legal provisions were placed in two countries with quite
different overall systems. The provisions then evolved differently in each
country to adapt to the different needs of those two systems. I suspect that
the same may have happened with the prohibition on bank ownership of
stock in Japan and Germany.
Q. My Best Guess
That, then, is the set of possible combinations of my stories of the past
and future. Before venturing a guess as to which scenario I find most
likely, let me underscore a more basic point. Neither economic and legal
167. See WEST, supra note 130, at 11-28 (conducting experiment in corporate
law in which one studies development of corporate law systems in two different
institutional settings).
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theory nor empirical evidence gives us much reason to confidently choose
one square among the sixteen in Table 2. As to theory, although the theory of the firm has much of interest to say as to corporate governance,
ultimately it cannot choose between the two competing systems. Each has
its own strengths and weaknesses. Theory does a good job of describing
and analyzing those strengths and weaknesses, but it cannot tell us which
strengths and weaknesses will turn out to be empirically decisive.
We also lack a convincing theory that can assure us that, under certain circumstances, the most efficient approach to corporate governance
will win out. If we did, although we might not be able to predict the outcome of the battle between these systems, at least we could say that in the
end, when one won, that one was the most efficient. However, we really
cannot even say that. Thus, if the American system does in the end come
to dominate in Japan and Germany as well, we will not be able to tell
whether the scenario followed was P1 - Fl, P2 - Fl, P3 - Fl or P4 - Fl.
The problem becomes even more intractable when we add distributional equity and participation as values alongside efficiency. Moral and
political philosophers have had even less luck sorting out those competing
values than economists have had in comparing the efficiency of competing
systems.
Moreover, empirical evidence on a question as broad and debated as
this one is quite incomplete and multi-tongued.' 68 Scholars on different
sides can select among the evidence to support their position. The debate
to date has been rather faddish based on the short-term success of the
different countries. 169 This is particularly troubling when one considers
that not only can and does short-term relative success change, but also the
causal link between corporate governance differences and overall economic performance is quite suspect-other factors may well swamp differences in corporate governance. A highly incomplete listing of relevant
factors includes differing natural resources, fiscal and monetary policy, educational systems, legal differences outside the area of corporate governance, culture, savings rates, demographic factors, the effects of World War
II (the United States won, Japan and Germany lost), and so on.
Thus, those participants in the convergence debate who confidently
predict convergence to a superior American way have no good basis for
that confidence. Perhaps they are guilty of availability bias' 7 0-as academics at elite American law schools they are mainly familiar with that American way, so when they ask how best to deal with the problems confronting
corporations, the methods most available to them are the American methods, which they have spent their careers studying.
168. See Licht, supra note 34, at 161-62 (noting empirical evidence is mixed in
comparative corporate governance scheme, especially concerning significance of
shareholder activism).
169. See id. at 162 (asserting debate over corporate governance, most notably
Japanese and German, has been "hot topic" over last few years).
170. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, my main point on the convergence debate is that there are
more possibilities on this question than most commentators have tended
to acknowledge, and we do not have much to go on in choosing among
these possibilities. Having said that let me try to choose. You have been
warned, though, about the likely accuracy of this choice.
Among the past stories, I favor P3. The two systems have complementary strengths and weaknesses in advancing efficiency. The Japanese system seems to have lagged over the past decade, but one should not be too
caught up in short-term comparisons. In terms of promoting participation
as well, it seems that the two systems have complementary strengths and
weaknesses-Japan and German firms probably do better at promoting
participation within the firm, but the United States does better at encouraging a wide variety of entrepreneurs to found their own firms. Japan and
Germany would appear to be superior at promoting equality. Overall, it is
hard to say that either system is clearly superior at this point. I do, however, think the differences between the United States and Japan and Ger17 1
many are real, and therefore P4 is implausible.
Choosing among the future stories is harder-not much of a surprise.
Predicting convergence to the Japanese-German system (F2) under current circumstances would have the virtue of boldness, but I cannot say I
possess that virtue in adequate quantities to make that prediction. That
just does not seem to be where things are heading at this point. Choosing
among the other three alternatives is harder, but the central tendency today seems to be convergence to a hybrid (F3), but one that is much closer
to the United States than to Japan or Germany. In saying this, I am claiming that the four kinds of system effects are tending to yield to the pressures of international competition in both product and financial markets.
Political defenses of the current system are still quite strong. However,
continued crises in the Japanese financial system suggest that at some
point the government will have to address the situation more seriously. In
Germany, meanwhile, there is some movement to unwind the system of
share crossholding and bank control, particularly with changes in the tax
law due to take effect. 172 Structural inter-relationships within systems may
prove less of an impediment as firms become more able to enter into relationships with banks or capital markets from other countries. I do think,
however, that such impediments may well prevent American firms and
states from adopting some practices and laws which work well within the
bank-centered system but not the market-centered system. This factor will
make the convergence hybrid closer to the American system than a pieceby-piece comparison of best practices might suggest. Informational effects
will diminish as people in different countries learn from each other. I
171. A wide variety of analysts, using a variety of techniques and arguments,
have found significant systematic differences between the countries. See sources
cited supra notes 7 and 35.
172. See generally Roe, supra note 28, at 171-72 (discussing pressure in Germany to reduce bank power and control in corporate structure).
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doubt that broad values are an important part of the reason for differences between the United States, Japan and Germany in corporate governance, while more narrow norms can be changed. Consider, for instance,
how the old norm among American corporate lawyers of not being involved in hostile takeovers collapsed.
As I have emphasized, the stories being considered here are ideal
types. Reality lies in between them. I do not think any tendency to convergence will be at all quick or complete, by any means, nor do I think it is
a good thing. 173 The persistence of a variety of system effects will greatly
slow down any convergence, and for a long time significant differences will
remain. For quite a while it may well be hard to tell whether the systems
are converging at all. Moreover, remember my main caveat: it is quite
possible that they are not.
VI.

EVALUATING THE SCENARIOS

Section V laid out sixteen different scenarios relating the past and
future stories of Sections III and IV. It then hesitantly, all-too-hesitantly,
offered a prediction as to which of these scenarios was most likely. This
section offers a normative evaluation of those scenarios.
It might seem that further normative evaluation is superfluous, given
that such an evaluation is built into the past stories. Thus, suppose one
accepts P1-namely, that the American system is superior. Does that not
imply that one is committed to saying either that the preferred future path
is F1, convergence to the American system, or perhaps F3, convergence to
a hybrid, if that hybrid involves cherry-picking particular good practices
from the Japanese-German system? If the American system is superior,
then surely convergence to it (F1) is preferable to the two systems remaining distinct (F4), right?
Not so fast. There is value to maintaining international diversity in
corporate governance circumstances. Perhaps the American system is superior under current economic circumstances. However, if circumstances
change the Japanese-German system could conceivably become preferable, or be capable of evolving into a preferable system. Or, even setting
aside changed circumstances, as the two systems continue to evolve the
Japanese-German system may some day surpass the United States. Thus,
even if we believe we can say one system is currently better than the other,
one may question whether we can say that this comparison will necessarily
remain true for all time to come.
Given this possibility, there is then value to be had from maintaining
international diversity in corporate governance systems, so that we do not
foreclose future alternatives and evolutionary possibilities. The argument
resembles the argument for biodiversity in species. 174 We gain from pre173. See infra Section VI.
174. Cf PAULO NUNES ET AL.,
OF BIODIvERsrY

ECOLOCIcAL-EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS AND VALUATION

26 (Dep't of Spatial Econ., Free Univ., Working Paper No. 00-100/
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serving even those species which do not seem to add much to the world at
this point, because at some point in thefuture those species may become
more valuable, for example, by becoming the source for a cure to a new
disease.

17 5

This issue raises a new question about each system: How capable are
they of evolving and adapting to changed circumstances and allowing new
systems to take root, if that is what is most appropriate? If the currently
superior system (if there is one) is unlikely to allow such evolution and
adaptation, then there may be good reason to prefer that both systems
remain in existence. On the other hand, if one system is quite adaptable,
there may be less need to maintain a variety of systems. Offhand, the
American market-based system seems likely to allow more experimentation and adaptation, but it is unclear whether it would encourage a move
to the Japanese-German system should such a move become desirable in
the future.
To the extent that the currently superior system would not allow adequate evolution and adaptation in the future, there is then a tradeoff between the current optimum-namely, convergence to the best systemand preparing for possible future changes in what is optimal. How one
evaluates that tradeoff depends on how much one discounts the future
and how likely it is that circumstances may change so as to make changing
the system desirable, or that the currently inferior system may one day
evolve to a superior system. It also depends, of course, on how much better the current system is. Personally, I think the case for maintaining diversity today, as a hedge against future change, is strong. Neither system is
clearly and strongly superior today, and the chances of things changing
significantly in the future appear good.
If I am fight that P3 is the right past story, there is also a simpler
reason why convergence may not be the best option. We could be converging toward the American system or a hybrid much closer to that system than to the alternative because international financial and product
market competition favors the more efficient system, and the American
system is currently more efficient. However, perhaps we should prefer the
alternative system on distributional equity and/or participation grounds.
Maintaining international diversity would allow those who want to live with
a more efficient system to choose to live under that one, while those who
prefer the fairness of the Japanese-German system could choose it. International competition may maintain that choice as well, but it may not, if
the values of equity or participation are not able to adequately influence
the selection mechanism.
It is possible, then, that current pressures for convergence may be too
strong, even if that convergence is to the current best system, according to
3, 2001) (examining origin of study of biodiversity and its relation to human economic activities), available at http://www.feem.it/web/activ/_activ.html.
175. See generally id. at 3 (discussing species diversity).
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some value. In considering international policymaking, both formal and
informal, it may well be that we should be looking for ways to reduce, not
increase, the pressure on Japanese and German decision-makers to follow
the American example. On the other hand, if I am wrong and P1 (the
American system has followed the superior path) is right, then preserving
the Japanese-German system would allow Japanese and German firms to
be left in a currently inferior state, to the harm of those countries. It is a
hard judgment call.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The core conclusion is that we cannot reach much of a conclusionbut that itself helps in thinking about what we should do. There are many
possible paths, and we do not have any particularly compelling reasons or
evidence pinpointing which we are on. Corporate governance systems
may converge or they may not. If they do converge it may or may not be to
the American system, and it may or may not be to the superior system.
Even if they do converge to the currently superior system, that may not be
a good outcome for the world economy.
It is good that American corporate law and governance scholars are
now paying more attention to how the rest of the world works. It is not so
good that so many of the most prominent of those scholars see this as a
chance to proclaim American superiority and try to convince others to
follow the American way. International comparisons open up a promising
research agenda to students of corporations. Such comparisons make
clear that there are many ways to deal with the challenges large corporations face. They provide some evidence for the relative strengths and
weaknesses of those different methods and structures.
What we can conclude from that evidence, however, is still quite unclear. We lack adequate theory of both how different forms of corporate
governance work and of how systems of corporate governance evolve and
change. Few of those writing on the subject possess deep knowledge of
1 76
the workings of corporate governance in several different countries,
and aside from the gang of four, almost no one is doing systematic comparative empirical research.
Given this pervasive lack of knowledge, those involved in national and
international policymaking and advice giving should be careful about toovigorously advocating a one-size-fits-all prescription for corporate governance. Market forces may already be too strongly pushing firms in some
countries toward convergence. These market forces may be supplemented by a variety of international policymaking and advice-giving organs, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. It is at this
level that Hansmann and Kraakman discern an international consensus in
176. I am no exception to that statement, I hasten to note.
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favor of the American model. 177 I think they discern that consensus only
by ignoring many voices, but they may be right that those voices are growing harder to hear. The opposition voices need a stronger mike to help
defend organizational diversity in both theory and practice. Even if market forces are pushing us toward convergence, those forces are not necessarily for the best, and we should not speed them along. We should slow
down the process and keep our options open. That is why initiatives such
as the Institute for International Corporate Governance and Responsibility
are valuable. The Institute will bring together academics and practitioners
interested in exploring and promoting alternatives to the American shareholder-dominant model. 178 Right now, such efforts are swimming against
the current-and that is precisely why they are needed.
177. There has been an explosion of published guidelines for good corporate
governance in many countries and by many organizations. See European Corporate Governance Network, Corporate Codes, Principles, Recommendations and Laws, at
http://www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/ecgn/codes.htm (last modified Sept. 19, 2001) (compiling full text corporate governance guidelines, principles of corporate governance and corporate governance reforms).
178. See International Institute for Corporate Governance & Accountability,
Welcome to JICGA, at http://128.164.132.19/iicga/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) ("The
mission of the Institute is to study corporate governance systems and capital markets throughout the world and develop methods to devise and sustain responsible
and accountable corporate behavior.").
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